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Note
Notice-and-Comment Rights for
Administrative Decisions Affecting
International Trade: Heightened Need,
No Response
William D. Araiza
Changes in world trade patterns have increased the importance of ad-
ministrative classifications of goods imported into the United States. The
post-1945 trade regime, characterized by multilateral reductions in trade
barriers applied on a non-discriminatory basis, has been challenged by the
emergence of discrete trading blocs' and by the rise of "managed trade,"
in which trade in a particular product is regulated by a system of bilateral
quotas.2 These phenomena have increased the differential tariff and quota
treatment accorded imported goods based on administrative classifications
of their type or country of origin.3
1. Examples of such trading blocs are the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Israel free trade areas and the
more tightly integrated European Community. See, e.g., Greenhouse, The Growing Fear of Fortress
Europe, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1988, § 3, at 1, col. 2 (reporting fears that tighter European integration
after 1992 will be accompanied by greater protectionist stance toward U.S. and Japan); Kuttner, Bloc
That Trade, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 17, 1989, at 16 (noting potential beneficial effects of move
toward discrete trading blocs).
2 Examples of managed trade are the bilateral restraint agreements (agreements by which one
nation limits its exports of a particular product to the other signatory) that the United States has
negotiated with various steel exporting nations and the bilateral agreements pursuant to the Mul-
tifiber Arrangement in textiles. For an example of a bilateral restraint agreement, see infra note 32.
For a discussion of the Iultifiber Arrangement, see infra note 29. For further information about
managed trade, see R. WALDMANN, MANAGED TRADE (1986); Passell, Managed Trade or Open
Trade, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1989, at D2, col. 1 (discussing benefits and drawbacks of managed trade).
3 See, e.g., U.S. Limits Increase on Van Tariffs, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1989, at Dl, col. 6
(reporting what was described as "purely technical" decision by Treasury Department to classify
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The increased importance of Customs Service ("Customs") and Com-
merce Department ("Commerce") product classifications by type or coun-
try of origin has made it more important than ever that interested parties
be able to participate in the process by which these classifications are
made.4 The "notice-and-comment" features of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act' were designed to afford parties affected by agency regulations a
meaningful opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process. Agencies
need not, however, provide these opportunities for public participation
when the regulations in question involve a military or foreign affairs func-
tion of the United States.'
This Note considers the foreign affairs exemption to the APA's notice-
and-comment requirements, as applied to Customs and Commerce regula-
tions affecting classifications of goods imported into the United States.'
The primary vehicles for this investigation will be two Federal court deci-
sions, Mast Industries v. Regan,' a 1984 decision by the Court of Inter-
imported vans and sport-utility vehicles as cars, not trucks, thereby avoiding tenfold increase in their
tariffs).
4. Participation in the classification process allows interested parties the chance to raise arguments
and bring to decision-makers' attention facts which would otherwise remain hidden. For a discussion
of the benefits of public participation in the rulemaking process, see K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND GOVERNMENT 124-25 (2d ed. 1975). The formal comment process is especially important
in the international trade context, where disparities in parties' political strength, see, e.g., N.Y. Times,
Apr. 23, 1984, at D1, col.1 (reporting potential electoral importance of domestic steel interests in 1984
election); institutional dynamics, see infra note 82; and the unexpected consequences of decisions, see
infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text, often mean that not all relevant groups are consulted before
decisions are made. Importers are often the major losers in this process. Without the political clout of
domestic manufacturers, they must rely either on formal administrative processes or diplomatic pres-
sure from the countries where the imported goods originate. The latter course carries with it the high
risk that private interests will be sacrificed for the sake of broader political relations, as occurred in
1981 when the U.S. Government directed that all lawsuits against public Iranian entities be sus-
pended as part of the agreement that ended the 1979-81 hostage crisis.
Because diplomatic channels offer little hope of redress, the primary means by which importers can
defend their interests are the procedural safeguards provided by administrative agencies.
5. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982 and Supp. V 1987) [here-
inafter APA or cited by section only).
6. See infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
7. The specific focus of this Note is the use (or misuse) of the foreign affairs exemption to deny
notice-and-comment rights in import classification decisions. For a broad consideration of the foreign
affairs exemption, see Bonfield, Military and Foreign Affairs Function Rule-Making Under the
APA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 221 (1972). This Note neither analyzes the justification for the foreign
affairs exemption per se, nor argues for a complete repeal of the foreign affairs exemption, as Profes-
sor Bonfield does. Rather, it attempts to justify a statutory grant of notice-and-comment rights in
import classification cases by demonstrating the misuse of the foreign affairs exemption, the tool em-
ployed by Federal courts and government agencies to deny these rights. The value of this functional
approach is (inadvertently) suggested by Bonfield himself when, in the course of calling for the repeal
of the foreign affairs exemption in the name of administrative process, he suggests a continuation of
the denial of notice-and-comment for rulemaking pursuant to the Multifiber Arrangement, see infra
note 29, but under another of the statutory exemptions to the notice-and-comment rules. See Bonfield,
supra, at 281-82.
By avoiding the mere substitution of labels for the same denials of notice-and-comment, the func-
tional approach of this Note may perhaps prove useful in analyzing the administrative process due in
other substantive legal areas implicating foreign affairs, such as immigration. See, e.g., infra text
accompanying notes 27-28.
8. 596 F. Supp. 1567 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), affd on other grounds, 822 F.2d 1069 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
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national Trade, and American Association of Exporters and Importers-
Textile and Apparel Group v. United States,9 a 1985 Federal Circuit
opinion. Both these decisions considered regulations relating to textile im-
ports pursuant to the Multifiber Arrangement." In both cases the courts
vindicated the agency's11 claim that such regulations fell under the foreign
affairs exemption to the APA's notice-and-comment provisions. 2
After a brief examination of the APA's notice-and-comment structure
in Section I, Section II examines judicial interpretations of the foreign
affairs exemption, paying special attention to the holdings in Mast and
AAEI-TAG. In response to these rulings, Section III proposes and at-
tempts to justify a statutory grant of notice-and-comment opportunities for
most instances of Customs and Commerce rulemaking concerning the clas-
sification of imported goods.
I. THE APA's NOTICE-AND-COMMENT PROVISIONS
Congress passed the APA in response to the explosive growth of the
administrative state during the New Deal era.' Tom Clark, Attorney
General at the time of the Act's passage, noted the fundamental character
of the rights set out in the APA when he described it as "a restatement of
the law of due process for administrative agencies."1
The spirit of Clark's comment is evident in the notice-and-comment
provisions of the APA, which set forth requirements for public participa-
tion in the agency rulemaking process. The notice-and-comment provi-
sions require that advance notice of proposed rulemaking be published in
the Federal Register,5 that interested persons be afforded the chance to
submit comments concerning the proposed rule,' 6 that the final rule be
published at least thirty days before its effective date,' 7 and that interested
persons be able to petition for "the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a
9, 751 F.2d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1985) [hereinafter AAEI-TAG].
10, Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973, 25 U.S.T. 1001,
T. A.S No. 7840 [hereinafter MFA]. For a discussion of the MFA, see infra note 29.
11. Mast involved Customs regulations. In AAEI-TAG Customs merely implemented the decision
of the Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements [hereinafter CITA], an arm of
Commerce.
12. Mast and AAEI-TAG are important because they are the only recent cases in which Federal
judges have analyzed in any detail the applicability of notice-and-comment requirements to import
cla.,ification decisions. Mast in particular attempts to provide an analytical framework for considering
APA-based challenges in this field. Judges in two cases since Mast have cited its analysis as sufficient
to decide the applicability of the foreign affairs exemption to import classification decisions. See Car-
lisle Tire and Rubber Co. v. United States, 634 F. Supp. 419, 423 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986); American
Inst. for Imported Steel v. United States, 600 F. Supp. 204, 211 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
13 1 K. DAVis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1:7, at 17-24 (1978).
14 Address by Attorney General Clark to the American Bar Association, reprinted in 92 CONG.
RE-( 2,088 (daily ed Mar. 8, 1946).
15 APA § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982).
16. Id. § 553(c).
17 Id. § 553(d).
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rule."18 A noted commentator has described this system as "one of the
greatest inventions of modern government."19
The same commentator, however, notes that "the weakness of [the no-
tice-and-comment provisions] may lie in [their] extensive exceptions."'
The APA includes an intricate and interlocking series of exemptions from
different segments of the notice-and-comment provisions.2 This Note ex-
amines in detail the interpretation of the term "foreign affairs" as used in
section 553(a)(1) of the APA, which exempts from notice-and-comment
procedures "military and foreign affairs functions."22
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
FUNCTION
A. Interpretations Before Mast and AAEI-TAG
Before the ruling in Mast, judicial interpretation of the foreign affairs
exemption centered on attempts by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) to invoke this exemption for its rulemaking regarding the
status of aliens living in the United States.23 These cases can be divided
into two groups: those growing out of INS actions affecting Iranian aliens
during the hostage crisis of 1979-81,24 and all others.2 5 In the Iranian
18. Id. § 553(e).
19. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §6:1, at 448 (1978). But see Koch, Public
Procedures for the Promulgation of Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy, 64 GEo.
L.J. 1047, 1073 (1976) ("Public participation [in administrative rulemaking] will not always improve
agency decisionmaking enough to offset the costs of imposing the procedure.").
20. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 122 (1975).
21. Agencies invoking the foreign affairs exemption are exempted from all of the notice-and-
comment requirements of § 553. Agencies are exempt from the provision of a time and place for
public comment (and presumably, though not explicitly, the requirement of allowing actual comment)
"when the agency for good cause finds . . . that notice and public procedure thereon are impractica-
ble, unneccessary, or contrary to the public interest." § 553(b). The requirement of § 553(d) that a
rule be published thirty days before its effective date is governed by its own "good cause" exemption,
§ 553(d)(3). Neither of the good cause exemptions, however, allows agencies to deny interested parties
the right to petition for alteration of a rule already promulgated, (§ 553(e)). In contrast, the foreign
affairs exemption also permits agencies to deny the right to petition. There also exist other exemptions
to the notice-and-comment requirements, none of which is relevant to our subject. For a discussion of
these other exemptions, see Bonfield, supra note 7.
22. The relevant section of the APA provides that "this section [mandating notice-and-comment
procedures] applies ...except to the extent that there is involved . . a military or foreign affairs
function of the United States. ... 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1).
23. But see WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601, 616 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 914
(1968) (FCC ruling on allocated strength of radio station signal was foreign affairs function as rule
was made pursuant to U.S.-Canada radio agreement); Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States,
634 F. Supp. 419, 423 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986) (de minimis rule in dumping case not foreign affairs
function); American Inst. for Imported Steel v. United States, 600 F. Supp. 204, 211 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984) (embargo rule on European steel exempt as foreign affairs function because rule goes to pur-
pose of international agreement to limit imports).
24. E.g., Nademi v. INS, 679 F.2d 811 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 872 (1982); Malek-
Marzban v. INS, 653 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1981); Yassini v. Crosland, 618 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1980);
Akbari v. Godshall, 524 F. Supp. 635 (D. Colo. 1981).
25. E.g., Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984), affd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846
(1985); Hou Ching Chow v. Attorney Gen., 362 F. Supp. 1288 (D.D.C. 1973).
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cases the INS consistently won the right not to provide a notice-and-
comment period. In the other immigration cases, however, courts ruled
against the applicability of the foreign affairs exemption.26 Both sets of
cases based their holdings on the strength of the connection between the
INS rule and the President's foreign policy. The Iranian cases, upholding
use of the foreign affairs exemption, turned on the courts' findings that in
promulgating the rules in question, the INS was implementing the
broader American reaction to the hostage seizure.27 In contrast, an Elev-
enth Circuit court ruled against the INS' claim to an exemption for
rulemaking concerning the internment of Haitian refugees in the early
1980's, citing the tenuous connection between the rules and the President's
foreign policy.2
B. Issues in Mast and AAEI-TAG
1. Introduction
Both Mast and AAEI-TAG consider, inter alia, APA-based challenges
to agency rulemaking pursuant to bilateral export restraint agreements
entered into as part of the MFA.z9 In both cases the plaintiffs claimed
that the rules were invalid because the agencies in question did not pro-
vide a notice-and-comment period. The agencies countered that the regu-
lations were foreign affairs functions and therefore exempt under the for-
eign affairs exemption.
The Customs rule challenged in Mast altered the criteria for determin-
ing the country of origin of textile products, requiring more substantial
transformation of a product before it could be considered a product of the
country where that transformation occurred.3" This rule threw into confu-
sion the carefully crafted plans of many foreign textile manufacturers,
who had arranged the production process so that the final stage was per-
formed in countries which had excess capacity under their quotas due to
either larger quotas or smaller pre-existing export industries.3
26. E.g., Jean, 727 F.2d at 962.
27. See, e.g., Malek-Marzban, 653 F.2d at 115-16.
28. Jean, 727 F.2d at 962.
29. The MFA is a multilateral agreement by which signatories agree to cooperate to minimize
"market disruption" in the international textile trade. MFA, supra note 10. Under the auspices of the
MFA, major textile exporting nations enter into bilateral export restraint agreements with major
importing countries. For more information on the MFA, see Giesse & Lewin, The Multifiber Ar-
rangement: "Temporary" Protection Run Amuck, 19 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 51, 98-107 (1987).
30. The regulation was an interim rule, taking effect five weeks after its appearance in the Fed-
eral Register. Notice-and-comment was provided prior to the promulgation of the final rule. How-
ever, the interim rule remained in effect during the notice-and-comment period. The Mast court ruled
that the APA requires notice-and-comment for rules regardless of their interim status. Mast Indus. v.
Regan, 596 F. Supp. 1567, 1579 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), affd on other grounds, 822 F.2d 1069 (Fed.
Cir. 1987).
31. For example, under the new rules assembly of a garment in one country from pieces knitted
abroad would no longer suffice to transform the garment into a product of the assembling country.
Thus, the change in the country-of-origin rules meant that sweaters assembled in Hong Kong from
19891
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The challenged rule in AAEI-TAG was Commerce's decision to invoke
a provision of the U.S.-People's Republic of China textile restraint agree-
ment 2 that authorized Commerce to impose a quota on Chinese textile
exports to the United States if the Department found "disruption" of the
U.S. textile market.3 3 In both of these cases the court ruled that the pro-
mulgation of these rules constituted a foreign affairs function, thus vali-
dating the agencies' denial of notice-and-comment procedures based on the
foreign affairs exemption.
2. The Broad Scope of the Holding in Mast
After an inconclusive examination of the legislative history of the ex-
emption 4 the Mast court ruled in favor of Customs. Specifically, the court
held that the regulations in question "'clearly and directly' involve[d] a
foreign affairs function," language the court borrowed from the House
report on the APA."5
The court reached this conclusion through several steps. First, it ruled
that the negotiation of agreements with foreign governments clearly and
directly involved a foreign affairs function. 6 It then found a foreign af-
fairs function whenever the President "defines, modifies or even violates
the terms of an international agreement, or directs his subordinates to do
so."" The court concluded that to the extent the interim regulations de-
fined or altered quantitative limits on textile imports, their promulgation
also "clearly and directly" involved a foreign affairs function and was
therefore exempt from the notice-and-comment requirements of the
panels knitted in China would now be considered products of China, a country which had a substan-
tially smaller quota for sweater exports to the U.S. than Hong Kong. Giesse & Lewin, supra note 29,
at 134-36.
32. Agreement Relating to Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-made Fiber Textiles and Textile
Products, Sept. 17, 1980, United States-People's Republic of China, 32 U.S.T. 2071, T.I.A.S. No.
9820.
33. Id. art. VIII.
34. The legislative history is even more ambiguous than conceded by the Mast court. For exam-
ple, the court's discussion of the scope of "foreign affairs" fails to mention the comment by the House
sponsor of the APA that "the exempted foreign affairs are those diplomatic functions of high impor-
tance which do not lend themselves to public procedures and with which the general public is ordina-
rily not concerned." 92 CONG. REc. 5,755 (1946). This view contradicts the Mfast court's more ex-
pansive interpretation of "foreign affairs" yet is not mentioned in the opinion. Even more 3ignificant
is the court's treatment of a passage from the House and Senate reports on the APA that defined
foreign affairs functions as those "which so affect the relations of the United States with other go% ern-
ments that, for example, public rule-making would provoke definitely undesirable international conse-
quences." H. R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1946); see also S. REP. No. 752, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1945). It is a reflection of the vagueness of this formulation that the two opinions
considered in this Note take completely different approaches to this definition: The Mast court denied
that the Government actually needed to demonstrate these consequences whereas the AAEI-TAG court
purported to find these consequences in the Government's argument. Blast, 596 F. Supp. at 1581;
American Ass'n of Exporters and Importers-Textile and Apparel Group v. United States, 751 F.2d
1239, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
35. Mast at 1583.
36. Id. at 1582.
37. Id.
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APA.38 In reaching this conclusion the court noted that the interim regu-
lations "[went] directly to the purpose of the trade agreements, i.e., the
limitation of textiles imported into the United States." '39
The Mast court's holding thus exempted from notice-and-comment a
broad category of administrative rules, made pursuant to policy agree-
ments to limit imports, which themselves affect the quantity or type of
goods to be allowed into the United States. By the logic of Mast, the pro-
mulgation of any Customs rule that happens to affect the limits on the
importation of a particular good is automatically exempt as a foreign af-
fairs function, as long as the policy decision to agree to those limits (for
example, the decision to reach a trade agreement with a foreign nation)
was itself a foreign affairs function. This interpretation (which appears
to be the most reasonable reading of the case41) would exempt from no-
tice-and-comment Customs classifications affecting a large percentage of
imported goods, for which access to the American market depends on a
Customs classification decision.42 In the absence of definitive legislative
history supporting this interpretation,43 the ruling's potentially enormous
impact on the classification of imports should require very strong policy
38. Id. at 1583.
39. Id. The Court of International Trade cited this reasoning in a similar case, American Inst. for
Imported Steel v. United States, 600 F. Supp. 204, 211 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), in which the court also
upheld Customs' denial of notice-and-comment based on the foreign affairs exemption.
40. A hypothetical case may clarify this point. Assume that the U.S. and South Korea agree to
restrict the importation into the U.S. of "high-grade" Korean steel, with no limits on the importation
of other Korean steel. In such a case it would probably be Customs' responsibility to formulate a
prccise definition of "high-grade" unless the term was unambiguously defined in the actual interna-
tional agreement. (Such specificity would be unusual in these cases; for example, the U.S.-China
textile treaty at issue in AAEI-TAG gave little guidance on the standards for determining "market
disruption.") Customs' definition of "high-grade" steel would clearly affect the quantity of Korean
steel which could be imported since, for example, a narrow definition would place most Korean steel
in the category with no import restrictions. The logic of the Mast opinion would require the conclu-
sion that the Customs rule was exempt as a foreign affairs function, since the regulation "define[s] or
alter[is quantitative limitations in [a] bilateral trade agreement." Mast, 596 F. Supp. at 1583.
41. It could be argued that the Mast holding is limited to cases in which agency action bears
directly on an international agreement rather than on a domestic statute enacted pursuant to an inter-
national agreement (for example, implementing legislation of a non-self-executing treaty). This rea-
soning appears to be prohibited by the opinion itself, which stressed the regulation's relation not to the
international agreement as such, but to the subject matter of the international agreement:
The Court holds that to the extent that the interim regulations define or alter quantitative
limitations in bilateral trade agreements or unilaterally imposed restrictions on textile im-
ports, they "clearly and directly" involve a "foreign affairs function" and are exempt from the
prior notice and comment provisions of the APA.
Mast, 596 F. Supp. at 1583 (emphasis added). This holding indicates that the court would reach the
same conclusion if the identical regulations had been promulgated pursuant to a Congressional statute
implementing the MFA and not pursuant to the agreement itself.
42. For example, the Mast holding would apply to Customs classification procedures affecting the
importation of any goods whose tariff or quota treatment was determined by either a bilateral trade
agreement or a multilateral agreement such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. The significance of the holding in Mast should thus be clear,
given the large percentage of imported goods for which either GATT or a bilateral treaty arrange-
ments determines quota or tariff treatment.
43. See supra note 34.
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reasons for construing the exemption in this way. None of the courts faced
with this issue has so far managed to adduce convincing policy reasons for
construing trade agreements so broadly.
3. AAEI-TAG: The Fear of Stockpiling
AAEI-TAG affirmed the legality of a Commerce decision to institute
textile import quotas and take other action pursuant to bilateral and mul-
tilateral trade agreements to which the United States was a party. The
AAEI-TAG court also affirmed Commerce's invocation of the foreign af-
fairs exemption to dispense with provision of a notice-and-comment pe-
riod before taking these actions.
In finding a foreign affairs function, the Federal Circuit court in AAEI-
TAG took a very different approach from the court in Mast. The AAEI-
TAG court put forth two separate arguments. The first relied on the legis-
lative history, also cited in Mast,"" allowing exemptions for matters which
" 'so affect relations with other Governments that, for example, public
rule-making provisions would provoke definitely undesirable international
consequences.' "" The court noted the possibility that prior disclosure of
the Government's intention to impose these restrictions would lead to a
temporary surge in imports of the affected goods, as importers rushed to
purchase goods before they became more scarce. 6 The court found that
such a surge would frustrate the intent of the regulations, which were
ostensibly designed to ease market disruption in the textile trade.4 ' The
AAEI-TAG court characterized this potentially counterproductive effect as
falling into the category of "definitely undesirable international conse-
48quences" and thus affirmed Commerce's invocation of the exemption.
As an alternative argument supporting the invocation of the exception,
the court noted the possibility that the President might use his authority to
implement the textile agreements as "part of his overall foreign policy." '
49
This argument rested on speculation that the President might act in this
field as part of "the Government's overall political agenda concerning re-
lations with another country"" ° and that these actions should therefore be
exempt from notice-and-comment. Relying on both speculation and vague
terms such as "overall foreign policy" and "overall political agenda," this
44. Mast, 596 F. Supp. at 1581.
45. American Ass'n of Exporters and Importers-Textile and Apparel Group v. United States, 751
F.2d 1239, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting H. R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1946),
and S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1945)).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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alternative rationale would seem to lead to inconsistent rulings whose le-
gal foundation could not be found in the opinion itself.5
The court's primary argument-that prior publication of the rule
would defeat its purpose-is not unique to rules implicating foreign af-
fairs functions. For example, any agency rule implicating purely domestic
commerce could fall in the category of rules for which prior publication
would be self-defeating. As the court's reasoning does not necessarily im-
plicate any "foreign" quality as the rationale for the exemption, use of the
"foreign affairs" exemption in this case appears inappropriate. If any-
thing, the court's rationale seems more illustrative of a "good cause"
exemption.52
Nonetheless, the court in AAEI-TAG found a foreign affairs exemption
by linking this "self-defeating" argument to the "definitely undesirable
international consequences" language in the legislative history."3 This ar-
gument makes some initial intuitive sense, since a rational importer would
presumably attempt to buy as much of a product as possible upon learn-
ing that the government was considering regulations which, if promul-
gated, would severely limit its availability. The logistical and financial
realities of importing, 4 however, call into question the threat posed by
stockpiling and thus the harm caused by provision of notice-and-comment
in such cases.
Two factors are key to assessment of the stockpiling concern. First, any
harm caused by provision of a notice-and-comment period is limited by
the relatively short time-frame these procedures require. Second, interna-
tional trade is an ongoing activity.55 Any stockpiling harm would therefore
equal only the amount stockpiled during the period between the publica-
51. See, e.g., Malek-Marzban v. INS, 653 F.2d 113,116 (4th Cir. 1981) (involvement of foreign
alfairs "obvious" in regulation directing that INS act against Iranian aliens residing in United States
during hostage crisis).
52. See supra note 21.
53. In doing so, the AAEI-TAG court agreed with the main scholarly interpretation of the foreign
affairs exemption, Bonfield, supra note 7. Bonfield specifically cites the Textile Import Program as an
example "in which advance public procedures of the type listed in section 553 may either cause the
%ery evil that the proposed rules are designed to avoid, seriously impair the ability of the agency to
perform its 'military or foreign affairs function,' or produce other serious undesirable consequences."
Bonfield, supra note 7, at 280. Although he advocates the repeal of the foreign affairs exemption,
Bonfield indicates that he would continue to favor denying notice-and-comment in situations such as
those in Mast and AAEI-TAG under the aegis of the good cause exemption. Bonfield, supra note 7, at
356.
54. See infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
55. The analysis would be different if the activity in question were not ongoing. For example, if
the issue were a decision to freeze a foreigner's U.S. assets, provision of notice-and-comment would
completely defeat the purpose of the rule, since any potential target could withdraw assets during the
inlerim period (In that case, the complete frustration of the proposed rule would outweigh the advan-
tages of notic-and-comment.) However, decisions to reclassify imported goods are made exactly be-
cause the imports are expected to continue into the future. Thus, international trade is a field in
which the harm from notice-and-comment would be, at worst, limited.
1989]
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tion of the notice of rulemaking and the effective date of the final rule, a
period as short as four-to-five weeks.5"
Several factors reduce the degree to which provision of a notice-and-
comment period would induce stockpiling. First, the time lag between or-
dering inventory from a foreign producer and actually having it clear Cus-
toms reduces importers' ability to react to publication of the proposed rule
by instantaneously stockpiling large quantities of the goods in U.S. ware-
houses. Even assuming that foreign suppliers would be willing to divert
shipments to the U.S. in response to a deadline, the time lag involved
would mitigate the amount of attempted stockpiling.5"
Second, stockpiling would require either large outlays of cash or, more
likely, extensions of credit to finance the purchases. Access to credit de-
pends on the financial condition of the individual firm involved; it is
therefore impossible to generalize about the effect of this requirement on
the amount of goods actually stockpiled. Still, the need to finance any
stockpiling should also mitigate any such activity. 8
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, a decision to import based on
proposed rulemaking is essentially a wager that a final rule will be
adopted which will severely reduce the product's availability. It is at least
questionable whether importers would be willing to take this risk, to the
extent of stockpiling enough goods to disrupt the market, on the basis of a
proposed rule. Indeed, the legislative history of the "short-supply con-
trols" provision of the Export Administration Act59 explicitly justifies its
56. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. EPA, 803 F.2d 545, 558-59 (10th Cir. 1986) (APA does
not mandate specific number of days for which agency must accept comments); Connecticut Light and
Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 525, 534 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
835 (1982) (30-day comment period with regard to rulemaking that adopted stringent fire protection
program for nuclear power plant not unreasonable, despite technical nature of subject). A five-week
period would allow 30 days for notice-and-comment plus one week to evaluate the comments. This
one week period should be sufficient, as agencies could also evaluate comments when received
throughout the comment period.
57. Empirical evidence supports this assertion. When Customs promulgated the country-of-origin
regulations which led to the Mast suit, importers responded not by stockpiling, but by cancelling
previously-placed orders. See Giesse & Lewin, supra note 29, at 136. The regulations took effect five
weeks after their publication in the Federal Register. Different industry structures render unhelpful
any generalization from this particular case. Nevertheless, it does suggest that stockpiling is not as
automatic a response as might initially be thought. One textile importer noted that it usually took
from six to nine months to complete a deal, from signing a contract to accepting delivery of the
merchandise. Xinhua General Overseas News Service, Aug. 22, 1984 (quoting Sam Gluckson, Chair-
man, Textile Apparel Group, American Association of Exporters and Importers). In the case of steel,
a Commerce Department official estimated that during 1988 the average lag between ordering im-
ported steel and taking delivery exceeded three months. Telephone interview with Jeff Laxague, Divi-
sion Director, Office of Agreements Compliance, Department of Commerce (Nov. 22, 1988).
58. See, e.g., ROBERT MORRIS ASSOCIATES, COMMERCIAL LOANS TO BUSINESS, Unit 6, at 3
(1984). Even if the financing is secured by the inventory purchased with the loan proceeds, the credit
risk (and thus the interest cost to the borrower) remains high due to the inherent riskiness of main-
taining a large amount of inventory. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
59. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The short supply controls allow the President
to limit exports of certain conftnodities in periods of shortage to avoid domestic economic dislocation.
In the case of scrap metal, domestic users and unions involved in those industries can petition for the
imposition of controls.
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provision of notice-and-comment on the theory that proposed rulemaking
alone will not panic the market into stockpiling."0 The risk is not merely
that controls will not be imposed and that importers will then be saddled
with extra inventory they did not need to buy. Rather, by stockpiling the
importer guesses about the state of the market several months later, when
economic conditions and tastes might well be different. Stockpiling is thus
a hazardous proposition, especially in products like textiles, where mar-
keting is affected by changing tastes and a seasonal product line," and in
raw or intermediate commodities, where prices fluctuate widely at the
wholesale level.6 2
C. The Applicability of Other Rationales for Invoking the Foreign Af-
fairs Exemption
Government agencies have offered a variety of alternative .rationales for
invoking the foreign affairs exemption. Certain of them are easily an-
swered. For example, the Postal Service and the Department of the Trea-
sury have both invoked the foreign affairs exemption when the agencies
have claimed that a proposed rule was either not controversial enough or
too insignificant to warrant the expense of providing a notice-and-
comment procedure.6 3 Similarly, the Department of State has cited the
foreign affairs exemption where affected members of the public have not
been identified or where the rule affects all citizens equally.6 None of
these rationales fits trade decisions, however, given the controversial na-
ture of these issues, their high stakes, and the extreme interest particular
parties have in their outcomes.
60. S. REP. No. 169, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
Ni.ws 1147, 1159 ("Concern was expressed that the filing of petitions [triggering the notice-and-
comment procedures) could precipitate panic ordering of the commodity or material in question, but
the majority of the members of the Committee believe that once the procedure has been in effect for a
period of time and it has been demonstrated that the filing of a petition does not necessarily result in a
dedsion to impose monitoring or controls, the market is not likely to respond unduly to the mere filing
of a petition.").
It is significant that these controls deal with exports of scrap metal, a product in which there is a
highly developed market and rapid price swings in response to perceived trends in availability. Con-
gress was well aware of this situation when it provided the notice-and-comment procedures. See, e.g.,
U.S. Export Control Policy and Extension of the Export Administration Act: Hearings on S. 737
Before the Subcomm. on International Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., lst Sess. 35-36 (1979) (statement of Frank Weil, Assistant Secretary of
Commerce).
61. See, e.g., Robinson, Some Caveats to Inventory Financing, J. COM. BANK LENDING, Apr.
1979, at 35, 36 (noting riskiness of inventory, for example, clothing, which is susceptible to seasonality
or style-based obsolescence); see also Dicker, How to Temper the Risks of Loans to Apparel Compa-
nies, Com. LENDING REV., Spring 1989, at 3, 5-6 (noting style and seasonality riskiness of apparel
inventory).
62. See, e.g., AM. METALS MARKET, Jan. 18, 1989, at 19 (graph) (composite price of shredded
scrap steel rises by approximately 45% between June and November, 1987); THE ECONOMIST, Oct.
10, 1988, at 113 (index of industrial metals prices falls 13.8% in one month); THE ECONOMtIST, Dec.
12, 1987, at 115 (price of nickel doubles during 1987).
63. See Bonfield, supra note 7, at 272.
64. Id.
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At least one agency has complained of the general loss of flexibility
entailed by the notice-and-comment requirements. This lack of flexibility
was cited as a justification for invoking the foreign affairs exemption
whenever the rule in question has some connection to foreign affairs.6 5
Such an argument is disingenuous. By itself, lack of flexibility cannot
be considered a justifiable rationale given the emphasis the APA places on
the concept of participatory rulemaking. In addition, even if lack of flexi-
bility were a justifiable reason for denying notice-and-comment, the for-
eign affairs exemption would not be the proper vehicle for its expression.
Rather, such a rationale would best be expressed by the "good cause"
exemption."
More plausible, and more related to "foreign affairs," is the use of the
exemption in cases involving confidentiality; that is, cases where rulemak-
ing either requires secrecy to be effective or is based upon secret informa-
tion, thereby reducing the usefulness to the agency of public comment. For
example, the Department of State has used this rationale to justify its
failure to provide notice-and-comment procedures in formulating its re-
sponses to political upheavals abroad. 7
This rationale is totally inapposite to rulemaking involving interna-
tional trade. While diplomatic information regarding foreign countries'
trade policies may be kept secret, most other information relevant to Cus-
toms and Commerce decisions of this type is not confined to governments.
Information on market trends, product availability, and the like is dissem-
inated widely, and private parties may well have information that public
rulemakers do not. Events in the Mast litigation demonstrate that govern-
ment rulemakers may in fact often be surprised by the information which
exists in the public sphere."8
Thus, the other rationales offered by agencies for invoking the foreign
affairs exemption fail to make a persuasive argument for its denial in the
context considered by this Note. In contrast to the issues giving rise to
these proffered rationales, international trade issues are important and
controversial, and information possessed by private parties can signifi-
cantly improve the quality of agency decision-making.
III. PROPOSAL
Because stockpiling is not a likely reaction to the provision of a notice-
and-comment period, and because Mast and AAEI-TAG ignore the bene-
fits afforded by these procedures, use of notice-and-comment procedures in
this area should be maximized. Specifically, interested persons should al-
65. Id. at 273-74.
66. See supra note 21.
67. See Bonfield, supra note 7, at 283-84.
68. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
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ways have the right to notice-and-comment in Customs and Commerce
rulemaking69 directly affecting the volume or type of imports unless the
President declares a national emergency pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act."0
This proposal takes the form of a statute, enacted pursuant to Congress'
constitutional authority to regulate foreign commerce, 1 requiring that
Customs and Commerce provide notice-and-comment opportunities in any
rulemaking affecting the volume or type of imports into the U.S., unless
the President declares a national emergency pursuant to IEEPA. It would
also specifically prohibit use of the foreign affairs or good cause exemp-
tions72 of section 553 to deny notice-and-comment.7 3
More extensive notice-and-comment rights in international trade
rulemaking by Customs and Commerce provide significant benefits relat-
ing both to the quality and the fairness of the rulemaking process.
First, the proposed statute provides a clearer standard for granting
these rights than does the foreign affairs exemption as presently construed.
Cases like AAEI-TAG, which rest on conclusory statements that agency
actions might be part of the President's "overall foreign policy,"7 4 require
almost pure speculation by courts, which in most cases are unwilling to
require disclosure of the information used in the President's decision. 5
69. This Note limits its call for statutorily-mandated notice-and-comment to Customs and Com-
merce rulemaking because it seeks to limit the statute's breadth to the functional area of international
trade. Expansion of the proposed statute's coverage to all agencies would implicate various other
governmental functions (e.g., procurement), analysis of which is beyond the scope of this Note. For a
discussion of issues surrounding procurement, see Golub & Fenske, U.S. Government Procurement:
Opportunities and Obstacles for Foreign Contractors, 20 GEO. WASH. J. IN'rL L. & ECON. 567
(1987) (factors entering U.S. Government procurement decisions).
70. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982) [hereinafter IEEPA]. IEEPA authorizes the President to
declare a national emergency if he finds the existence of "any unusual and extraordinary threat,
which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security,
foreign policy, or economy of the United States." Id. §1701(a). Presidents have invoked IEEPA on
several occasions to impose sanctions against foreign nations. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,513, 3
C.F.R. 342 (1986) (sanctions against Nicaragua). For more information on IEEPA, see Carter, Inter-
national Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CALIF. L. REV.
1159, 1229-42 (1987).
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
72. Use of the good cause exemption would also be explicitly prohibited, given the superficial
suitability of the good cause exemption in cases similar to Mast and AAEI-TAG. See Bonfield, supra
note 7, at 291-315. Prohibiting use of only the foreign affairs exemption would thus allow Customs
or Commerce to continue to deny notice-and-comment by invoking the good cause exemption.
73. Substantial precedent exists for statutory mandates of notice-and-comment rights in specific
situations. Over 130 statutes specifically refer to § 553. Most of these references require the relevant
agency to follow the procedures set forth in § 553 in their rulemaking pursuant to that statute. E.g.,
30 U.S.C. § 126 7 (g) (1982) (procedure for rulemaking to guard against conflicts of interest among
state mine regulators). Congress has also explicitly prohibited agency use of particular exemptions set
forth in § 553 to deny notice-and-comment. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1262 (1982) (Health and Human
Services Department procedure for declaring toys hazardous, prohibiting agency use of good cause
exemption).
74. American Ass'n of Exporters and Importers-Textile and Apparel Group v. United States, 751
F.2d 1239, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
75. E.g., Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) (declining to
review presidential determinations on grants of airline routes based on foreign policy information
available only to President).
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The proposed statute authorizes the President to dispense with notice-
and-comment only if he explicitly asserts the existence of "an unusual and
extraordinary" foreign-based threat, the language which triggers his au-
thority under IEEPA.7 ' This requirement obviates the need for courts to
reach decisions based on speculation and a near-total lack of information.
Second, the statute would assure better balancing of the interests of
competing groups. Trade issues are especially susceptible to domestic
pressure by well-organized interest groups (usually groups which either
import the good in question or manufacture competing domestic prod-
ucts).17 Indeed, it could be said that trade decisions are to a large degree
choices made between two domestic groups, namely, importers and manu-
facturers of competing domestic products. Two commentators have put it
bluntly: "politics dictate policy choices in the realm of U.S. textile and
apparel trade." ' 8 Similar observations could be made with regard to other
industries.7 9 The stakes in these decisions are often large enough to com-
pel heavy lobbying.8" The fact that various groups consider these issues so
important makes public rulemaking all the more fundamental to fulfilling
the APA's vision of open government. Mandated notice-and-comment pro-
cedures ensure at least some access to decision-makers for all interested
parties. 8'
The contentiousness of trade decisions also increases the potential for
agency abuse of the tradition al judicial deference to the Executive's con-
duct of foreign affairs. By requiring presidential certification before
rulemaking can be exempted from notice-and-comment, the proposed stat-
ute reduces the potential for abuse of the exemption by taking the decision
out of the hands of agencies more prone to pressure or capture by interest
groups.82 In addition, the requirement that the President declare a na-
76. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982).
77. For an analysis of this phenomenon, see K. JONES, POLITICS vs. ECONOMICS IN WORLD
STEEL TRADE 41-48 (1986).
78. Giesse & Lewin, supra note 29, at 81.
79. See, e.g., Walter, Structural Adjustment and Trade Policy in the International Steel Indus-
tby, in TRADE POLICY IN THE 1980's, at 483, 509 (W. Cline ed. 1983) ("[Tlhe steel industry has
shown a singular ability to penetrate governmental institutions and achieve a telling impact on public
policy .... Governments have gone to great lengths to assure the proper legal and political
frameworks within which the sectoral protection of steel can be realized."); see also U.S. Limits In-
crease on Van Tariffs, supra note 3, at D1, col. 6 (describing foreign lobbying to change Customs
Department classification of vans and sport-utility vehicles as trucks, which had increased their tariff
rate tenfold).
80. See, e.g., American Trade Policy: Actors, Issues, Options, 6 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 49 (Spe-
cial Issue 1988) (noting favorable economics of lobbying); see also N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1984, at DI,
col. I (noting extensive lobbying efforts by steel interests to ensure passage of quota bill).
81. The opportunity to comment would, of course, be open to all groups, not just importers or
manufacturers of domestic competing products. The APA's definition of "person" makes no mention
of nationality as a criterion. 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (1982). Nor should mandated notice-and-comment be
dismissed out of hand as ineffective in allowing interested groups to contribute meaningfully to agency
deliberations. See, e.g., J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: THE AMERICAN PVB-
LIC LAW SYSTEM 452 (1985) (giving example of significant change in agency rule based on comments
submitted by interested parties).
82. Capture of agencies by private interests has led to the situation characterized as the "iron
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tional emergency before using IEEPA's powers will tend to limit use of
this power in cases involving only one industry."
Third, international trade is an area in which notice-and-comment is
especially important because of the threat of international retaliation
against U.S. actions perceived as protectionist. Prior notice would alert
policy-makers to the concerns of groups not directly connected with the
subject matter at issue but whose interests could suffer if the action was
carried out. For example, the country-of-origin rules challenged in Mast
provoked strong protests from U.S. agricultural interests, who feared a
repeat of the 1983 Chinese boycott of American wheat in response to pre-
vious protectionist textile rules promulgated by the U.S. 4 In addition, a
Hong Kong commercial association responded to the new regulations by
boycotting American tobacco products, threatening $50 million in U.S.
cigarette exports."5 Moreover, it was thought that South Korea might re-
spond by cutting back purchases of American goods as diverse as nuclear
power equipment and farm products."' A spokesperson for the Reagan
Administration admitted that the widespread opposition to the regulations
had surprised "at least some people" in the White House. 7
As the Mast court itself noted, the APA's notice-and-comment provi-
sions were included in part to avoid precisely this problem." An analo-
gous situation exists with respect to section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974,9 which authorizes the President to respond to unfair foreign trade
practices and provides for notice-and-comment procedures before presi-
dential action.90 As one commentator on section 301 noted, the purpose of
notice-and-comment in that context "is to try to ensure that any . . . ac-
tion taken under section 301 furthers United States interests and limits
any adverse effects on sectors of the economy other than those of the peti-
tioning industry or industries." '91 For much the same reason, Congress has
also mandated the provision of notice-and-comment for government ac-
triangle" between industry, the relevant congressional committees, and the agencies. See G. ADAMS,
THE IRoN TRIANGLE 24-26 (1981); cf Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63
TEx. L REV. 207, 230 (1984) (committee system "exerts pressure for the creation of private benefits
flkwing to the onstituencies represented on the committee").
83. But see Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal
Regime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1159, 1234-38 (1987) (discussing potential overuse of presidential powers
under IEEPA).
84. Textile Regulations Protests Interfering with Strategy to Get President Reelected, I Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 204 (Aug. 22, 1984). Indeed, China did cancel some wheat orders in
respon~e to the new textile regulations. Women's Wear Daily, Aug. 23, 1984, at 19.
85. Customs Service Announces Partial Delay in Implementing Country-of-Origin Rules, 1 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 228 (Aug. 29, 1984).
86. E. Asian Executive Rep., Oct. 15, 1984, at 13.
87. N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1984, at D6, col. 1.
88. Mast Indus. v. Regan, 596 F. Supp. 1567, 1579 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), affd on other
grounds, 822 F.2d 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
89. 19 U.SC. §§ 2411-2416 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
90. For a discussion of the § 301 procedures, see Bello, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974:
Requirements, Procedures and Developments, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 633, 650-51 (1986).
91. Id. at 651.
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tions taken pursuant to other trade statutes. 2 The proposed statute's pro-
vision of notice-and-comment procedures would serve the same salutary
purpose.
Obtaining input before the promulgation of a rule is especially impor-
tant in trade issues, as the diplomatic character of international trade rela-
tions makes it more difficult for Customs to back down from implement-
ing a final regulation than to refrain from promulgating a proposed
regulation in the face of threatened retaliation. In other words, a notice-
and-comment period before the adoption of the final regulation affords an
opportunity for a graceful retreat should the proposal elicit threats of re-
taliation from abroad. In the Mast case, the reaction to the regulations,
including foreign threats of retaliation, forced government officials to con-
sider what were described as "fairly radical proposals" including delaying
enforcement of the regulations.9" This embarrassment may have been
avoided had Customs provided a notice-and-comment period before
promulgating the rules.9"
Fourth, provision of notice-and-comment would elicit from the public
information to help the agency reach a better decision. This would have
been the case in the fact situations surrounding both Mast and AAEI-
TAG. In Mast the issue was the new country-of-origin rules for textiles,
promulgated pursuant to the section of the MFA authorizing anti-
circumvention measures. The plaintiffs, however, had strong arguments
that the new regulations not only fell well outside the range of previous
anti-circumvention measures taken by Customs, but also found no support
in the section of the MFA cited by Customs as authority for their promul-
gation. 5 In AAEI-TAG the issue was even clearer: a Commerce finding of
"market disruption," a term defined in the MFA96 and incorporated into
the U.S.-China textile agreement cited by Commerce as authority for the
imposition of the textile quota.97 As in Mast, the plaintiffs in AAEI-TAG
92. E.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2702 (Supp. V 1987) (presidential revocation of beneficiary status of nation
under Caribbean Basin trade agreement); 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (trade relief if
rising imports threaten U.S. industry).
93. Women's Wear Daily, Dec. 5, 1984, at 9.
94. An analogous argument in favor of informal rulemaking has also been made in the context of
export controls. For example, in calling for a notice-and-comment period before export controls could
be promulgated, one commentator has written that "notice and comment rulemaking would assure a
reasonable time for consideration of, and public discussion about, proposed foreign policy controls,
The controls would not be in effect [during the notice-and-comment period], and the President
could not argue that the Rubicon had been crossed." Debevoise, Trade Restraints: The Legal-
Political Dichotomy, 14 U. TOL. L. REv. 1299, 1313 (1983) (citation omitted) (emphasis added), see
also J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, supra note 81, at 453 (advance notice of proposed rulemaking "can
. . . also permit the agency to identify pockets of resistance to, or arguments against, new policies
before committing its full energies and prestige to an unpopular initiative").
95. See Giesse & Lewin, supra note 29, at 131-36; see also N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1984, at D6,
col. I (GATT panel requests suspension or withdrawal of U.S. regulations).
96. MFA, 25 U.S.T. 1001, 1017, T.I.A.S. No. 7840, at 16.
97. Agreement Relating to Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-made Fiber Textiles and Textile
Products, Sept. 17, 1980, United States-People's Republic of China, 32 U.S.T. 2071, 2077-78,
T.I.A.S. No. 9820, at 7-8.
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had substantive arguments challenging the validity of the agency's finding
of "market disruption. ""8 In both cases, then, the importer-plaintiff made
arguments, supported by data, directly challenging the interpretation
made by the agency. As the Mast court itself noted, a prime reason behind
the notice-and-comment provisions was the drafters' desire to create mech-
anisms for agencies to receive all relevant information before making a
decision.99 Denial of notice-and-comment in these circumstances defeats
that purpose.
Fifth, the proposed statute would harmonize agency practice by provid-
ing in fact situations like those in Mast and AAEI-TAG the same notice-
and-comment procedures which agencies such as Customs already provide
in analogous situations. For example, Customs regulations presently allow
for public rulemaking in cases arising out of claims alleging that imported
goods are misclassified.100 The regulations allow these product classifica-
tion petitions to be filed by "domestic interested parties," defined as man-
ufacturers, trade groups, trade associations, or unions involved in the pro-
duction of a domestic competing good.101 Notice of the filing is published
in the Federal Register,0 2 and interested parties may submit comments.
If Customs determines that the challenged classification is incorrect, it
publishes a notice to that effect in the Customs Bulletin and the Federal
Register.10 3 The rule becomes effective thirty days after publication.0 4
Thus, the existing Customs regulations parallel the notice-and-
comment procedures this Note proposes for similar agency determinations,
such as those discussed in Mast and AAEI-TAG.105 This fact undercuts
98. The plaintiffs noted, for example, that the Commerce determination was based on market
information as much as two years old. American Ass'n of Exporters and Importers-Textile and Ap-
parel Group v. United States, 751 F.2d 1239, 1242-43 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
99. Mast Indus. v. Regan, 596 F. Supp. 1567, 1579 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), affd on other
grounds, 822 F.2d 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
100. 19 C.F.R. §§ 175.22-.25 (1988).
101. Id. at § 175.3.
102. Id. at § 175.21(a).
103. Id. at § 175.22(a).
104. Id.
105. These regulations are, in fact, quite similar to the rules at issue in Mast and AAEI-TAG.
Customs has provided notice-and-comment in cases where domestic companies challenged product
classifications explicitly mentioned in international agreements. An example is the petition filed Janu-
ary 4, 1988, by Armco, Inc., and Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corporation, two domestic steel producers,
challenging the classification of silicon electrical steel. See 53 Fed. Reg. 26605-06 (July 14, 1988)
(noting that product in question was covered by specific category of Voluntary Restraint Agreement
on Steel between U.S. and Japan). That these cases turned on the interpretation of an international
agreement renders them analytically indistinguishable from AAEI-TAG, in which Commerce denied
notice-and-comment.
The only plausible distinction is between these product classification procedures and the rules in
Mast; namely, that the Mast rules apply to a broad category of goods (as opposed to individual
products) and were promulgated by Customs acting on its own (and not by a formal petition filed by
a domestic interest group).
The second difference is not significant. Indeed, Customs' action in Mast can hardly be described as
having been taken on its own accord, given the intense political pressure applied by the domestic
textile lobby to tighten the country-of-origin rules. See, e.g., Giesse & Lewin, supra note 29, at
129-30. The same argument can be made for most trade decisions, given the degree of political pres-
1989]
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 99: 669
the argument that denial of notice-and-comment in cases such as Mast
and AAEI-TAG is justifiable, either generally as a foreign affairs function
or because it might lead to undesirable international consequences.
Even while providing these substantial benefits, the proposed statute
does not entail any significant costs. The risk of stockpiling, cited by the
court in AAEI-TAG, has been shown to be minimal.10 6 The only other
fear articulated by either the Mast or the AAEI-TAG court is of interfer-
ence with the President's conduct of foreign policy.' The proposed stat-
ute, however, allows an exemption from notice-and-comment if the Presi-
dent finds "an unusual and extraordinary" foreign-based threat to the
American economy, or to United States foreign policy or security interests,
and acts on that finding by declaring a national emergency and invoking
powers granted him by IEEPA. Thus, for example, trade embargoes im-
posed in response to what are perceived as serious threats to U.S. political
or security interests could be exempted from prior public rulemaking if
the President made the requisite determination. 8
To summarize, the proposed statute promotes the general goal of gov-
ernment open to citizen input and the specific goal of fairer and more
consistent decision-making in trade issues. Combined with the presidential
power to circumvent notice-and-comment when necessary to protect na-
tional interests, and in light of the illusory nature of the stockpiling fear,
the provision of notice-and-comment presents no significant drawbacks.
sure brought to bear on the trade bureaucracy. Thus, the only potentially significant difference is the
broader nature of the rules in Mast, compared to the individual product classifications for which
Customs already provides notice-and-comment. There seems to be no analytical basis for distinguish-
ing based on the degree of specificity of the proposed rule. It makes little sense to provide a different
notice-and-comment regime for rules relating, say, to textiles in general than for rules relating to
individual textile products, since the agency could presumably choose to couch its regulations at
whatever level of generality necessary to avoid having to provide notice-and-comment. The similarities
between the product classification petitions and the procedures in Mast and AAEI-TAG therefore
seem to outweigh any differences.
106. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
107. American Ass'n of Exporters and Importers-Textile and Apparel Group, 751 F.2d 1239,
1249 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
108. The proposed statute does not provide for judicial review of the President's certification.
While judicial review might help ensure that presidential certifications are made on the basis of genu-
ine national interests and not as a cover for avoiding notice-and-comment, it is questionable whether a
court would agree to undertake such a review. The case against reviewability in our situation is
strengthened by the fact that a reviewing court would need to examine a presidential finding that,
based on information presumably known only to him, a threat existed of the sort contemplated by
IEEPA. In the past courts have refrained from conducting reviews of foreign policy actions based on
information the court believes should be confidential. See, e.g., Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) (Court declines to review presidential determinations on grants of
airline routes based on foreign policy information available only to President). But see Japan Whaling
Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (political question doctrine does not bar
Court from interpreting domestic statute which may require repudiation of international agreement).
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V. CONCLUSION
Writing over twenty years ago, one commentator cited "the talismanic
deference to, and loose definition of, the magic words 'foreign affairs' " as
a major barrier to the provision of administrative process to parties en-
gaged in international economic relations.1 09 Sadly, that comment rings as
true today as in 1965, as evidenced by the rulings in Mast and AAEI-
TAG. Congress should bestow on parties engaged in international com-
merce the same procedural rights described by Attorney General Clark in
1946 as components of basic due process law."' This Note has demon-
strated not just the general, widely-known benefits of notice-and-comment
procedures, but also the special benefits such procedures offer in the inter-
national trade area. It has also demonstrated the illusory nature of the
fears expressed by the courts in denying notice-and-comment rights in this
sphere. With no apparent significant costs to mandating these procedures,
the case for denying such basic rights appears weak indeed.
109. Timberg, Wanted: Administrative Safeguards for the Protection of the Individual in Inter-
national Economic Regulation, 17 ADMIN. L. REv. 159, 164 (1965).
110. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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